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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 Nos. 11-1593 & 11-2251 
 ___________ 
 
 DARREN M. NANCE, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF NEWARK; NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT; THE MAYOR,  
SHARPE JAMES; JOSEPH J. SANTIAGO; THOMAS C. O'REILLY; ROBERT K. 
RANKIN, JR.; MITCHELL MCQUIRE; MICHAEL O'CONNOR; JAMES DAVID 
O'CONNOR; WILLIE E. UNDERWOOD; IRVING B. GULLER; JOSE OMAR 
COLON; CHADRAKANT PATEL; JAMES E. TUNIS; ISABELLA CASTELLANOS; 
VINCENT BONGERMINO; JOHN DOES (1-10); RICHARD PARABOSCHI; 
NICHOLAS MARESCA; ANTHONY CAMPOS; JOHN ZAKOWSKI 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-06184) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 14, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 15, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 
 Darren M. Nance appeals pro se from the orders of the District Court denying his 
motions for reinstatement to his former employment and for prejudgment interest 
following a jury verdict in his favor.  We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 
for further proceedings.
1
 
I. Background 
 Nance was terminated from his position as a police officer for the City of Newark, 
New Jersey, in 1996.  He later filed suit against the City of Newark, the Newark Police 
Department and numerous individual defendants (collectively, the “City”) alleging that 
they terminated him in retaliation for whistle-blowing activity and other conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.  Nance asserted claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 to 
-49.  He also sought both monetary damages and the equitable relief of reinstatement to 
his position.  Nance was represented by counsel in the District Court, where the parties 
litigated his claims for some fourteen years. 
 The parties finally tried the case to a jury for twelve days in June 2010.  On June 
24, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Nance on two claims:  a § 1983 First 
                                                 
1
 After noticing a reference to an apparent settlement in a December 9, 2011 letter 
docketed in the District Court, we directed the parties “to address in their briefs the nature 
and status of the apparent settlement and whether it has resolved any of the issues 
presented in these appeals.”  We note with displeasure that the parties later filed their 
briefs on the merits but have not complied with that direction.  Because we have no 
reason to believe that any potential settlement concerns the issues raised on appeal, 
however, we proceed to address them.  
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Amendment retaliation claim based on his petitioning activity, and a “discrimination 
and/or retaliation” claim under the NJLAD.  The next day, the jury returned a general 
verdict on damages awarding Nance $350,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in 
punitive damages.   
 Shortly thereafter, Nance filed a motion with the District Court for reinstatement 
to his former position.  The District Court denied that motion by order entered October 
20, 2010.  Nance filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on 
February 3, 2011.  Nance‟s pro se appeal from that order is docketed at C.A. No. 11-
1593.  After filing that appeal, Nance requested prejudgment interest on the entire jury 
award.  The District Court denied that request on May 2, 2011.  The next day, the District 
Court formally entered judgment on the jury‟s verdict.  Nance then filed pro se the appeal 
docketed at C.A. No. 11-2251.  The City has not appealed and instead has satisfied the 
judgment.  We consolidated these appeals and now address them together. 
II. C.A. No. 11-1593 
 In this appeal, Nance challenges the District Court‟s order denying his motion for 
reinstatement to his former position.  The City has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.  We conclude that we have jurisdiction, and we will affirm. 
A. Jurisdiction 
 The City argues that this appeal is untimely.  According to the City, the District 
Court entered its judgment when it entered the jury verdict on the docket June 30, 2010.  
The City characterizes Nance‟s subsequent motion for reinstatement as a motion to alter 
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or amend that judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It 
further characterizes Nance‟s actual Rule 59(e) motion as an improper successive Rule 
59(e) motion that does not toll the time to appeal, and it argues that Nance‟s appeal is 
untimely because he did not file it within thirty days after the District Court denied his 
motion for reinstatement. 
 We reject these arguments.  Nance‟s notice of appeal was due to be filed within 
thirty days after entry of the “judgment.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  “With regard to an 
appeal from a jury verdict, the thirty days does not begin to run—i.e., „entry of judgment‟ 
has not occurred—until the judgment is set forth in a separate document pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and the clerk of the court enters the judgment into the 
civil docket pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).”  Local Union No. 1992 
of Int‟l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 In this case, the jury returned its damages verdict on June 25, 2010 (Docket No. 
215), but the District Court did not enter judgment on the docket until May 3, 2011 
(Docket No. 255).  In the meantime, the District Court denied Nance‟s motions for 
reinstatement and reconsideration, and Nance filed his notice of appeal on March 3, 2011.  
Thus, Nance‟s appeal is not untimely, because the District Court had not yet entered 
judgment when he filed it and his time to appeal had not yet begun to run.  To the 
contrary, Nance‟s notice of appeal was instead premature.  That premature notice of 
appeal has now ripened because the District Court has since entered its final judgment.  
See DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) 
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(discussing Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983)).  And Nance 
filed a second, timely notice of appeal thereafter in any event.  Accordingly, the City‟s 
motion to dismiss C.A. No. 11-1593 for lack of jurisdiction is denied.  We have 
jurisdiction over both appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
B. The Merits 
 Nance challenges the District Court‟s denial of his motion for reinstatement to his 
former position, and he has raised no separate challenge to the District Court‟s denial of 
reconsideration of that issue.  A wrongfully terminated party can be made whole going 
forward either by an award of front-pay or by the equitable remedy of reinstatement, but 
“reinstatement is the preferred remedy in the absence of special circumstances militating 
against it.”  Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 1995).  Reinstatement may 
properly be denied if the relevant circumstances, such as animosity between the parties, 
make it impracticable.  See id. at 172; Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 
1089, 1103 (3d Cir. 1995); Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 899 (3d Cir. 
1993).  The routine and incidental burdens that such relief generally entails, however, are 
“„usually insufficient, without more, to tip the scales against reinstatement[.]‟”  Squires, 
54 F.3d at 173 (quoting Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 322 (1st Cir. 
1989) (en banc)).  To the contrary, “„equitable considerations different in kind or degree 
from those regularly accompanying reinstatement must be present if reinstatement is to 
be withheld from the victim of a first amendment infraction.‟”  Id. (quoting Rosario-
Torres, 889 F.2d at 323).  We review the District Court‟s ruling for abuse of discretion 
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and “do not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”  Id. at 171.   
 In this case, the District Court properly recognized the foregoing principles, 
including the general preference for reinstatement.  The court concluded, however, that 
reinstatement is not warranted for three separate reasons.  First, the court concluded that 
Nance has been deemed psychologically unfit for duty and that, given the unique nature 
of police work, his reinstatement might pose a risk to public safety.  Second, the court 
concluded that Nance‟s fourteen-year absence from the police force makes reinstatement 
impracticable because there have been major changes in police department operations in 
the interim that would require complete retraining at a time when the Department has had 
to lay off qualified officers for budgetary reasons.  Finally, the court concluded that “the 
continued and irreparable animosity” between Nance and the defendants would make his 
reinstatement a “recipe for disaster.”  The District Court based these conclusions both on 
materials that the City submitted in opposition to Nance‟s motion for reinstatement and 
on its observation of the evidence at trial.   
 Nance raises numerous (though cursory) arguments addressed to this ruling.  Most 
of them challenge the District Court‟s assessment of the evidence presented at trial.  We 
cannot review these arguments, however, because Nance has not ordered the trial 
transcripts and they are not otherwise of record.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2) (“If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the 
evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a 
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transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or conclusion.”).2  Nance argues, for 
example, that evidence introduced at trial establishes that he is psychologically fit to 
perform the duties of a police officer.  Nance, however, has neither identified that 
evidence nor made it available for our review.  Consequently, Nance‟s arguments in this 
regard provide no basis to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion.
3
 
 Liberally construing Nance‟s brief, we discern two arguments that the absence of 
the trial transcript does not prevent us from reviewing.  First, Nance argues that the 
District Court “failed to adhere” to the controlling legal standard under Squires by failing 
to recognize that reinstatement is the preferred remedy.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 8, 10.)  As 
explained above, however, the District Court expressly acknowledged that principle but 
concluded that three considerations make reinstatement impracticable in this case. 
                                                 
2
 Nance is not indigent and is therefore ineligible for transcripts at the Government‟s 
expense (which he did not request in any event).  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(f), 1915(c).  
Although Nance‟s failure to order the transcript “constitutes grounds for dismissal of the 
appeal,” 3d Cir. LAR 11.1 (2010), we will not take that step. 
 
3
 The same applies to Nance‟s arguments that the District Court failed to take judicial 
notice of evidence presented at trial and that no testimony or other evidence presented at 
trial supported the District Court‟s conclusion regarding animosity between the parties.  
We have nevertheless considered whether the District Court‟s reliance on Nance‟s 
unfitness for duty might impermissibly conflict with the jury‟s verdict, cf. Squires, 54 
F.3d at 174 & n.11, but we cannot say on this record that it did.  Without a transcript of 
the evidence presented at trial or the jury instructions, we cannot determine whether the 
jury necessarily rejected a defense based on Nance‟s alleged unfitness for duty.  We can 
surmise at most that the jury determined that Nance‟s protected activity was a but-for 
cause of his termination, see id. at 174 n.11, but we cannot say that the jury necessarily 
found that Nance is presently fit for duty, psychologically or otherwise.  Nance also 
argues that the District Court “[i]mproperly relitigated” a 1992 administrative decision, 
but he provides no details in that regard.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 8.) 
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 Second, Nance challenges the District Court‟s reliance on the second of those 
considerations—the passage of time and resultant necessity of retraining.  In assessing 
that factor, the District Court relied on an affidavit by the City‟s Police Director, who 
stated that the fourteen-year passage of time would require “complete retraining” for 
Nance at a time when the City was facing the prospect of 200 layoffs or demotions for its 
otherwise qualified police officers.  Nance submitted countervailing affidavits from the 
President and the Second Vice President of the City‟s Fraternal Order of Police, both of 
whom stated, among other things, that any necessary retraining would be minimal and 
that Nance would have only to be “brought up to speed” on policy developments and the 
like.  Nance argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider 
these affidavits.  It is true that the District Court did not mention these affidavits, which is 
troubling.  The question ultimately before us, however, is whether the District Court‟s 
ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.  We are unable to conclude that it does.   
 There is no indication from the District Court‟s opinion that, even if it were 
persuaded by Nance‟s affidavits on the issue of retraining, its ultimate ruling would have 
been different.  To the contrary, the District Court based its ruling also on the separate 
consideration of continued animosity between the parties.  In that regard, it expressly 
relied on its observation of the testimony at trial in concluding that “[t]o reinstate Plaintiff 
Nance would mean to re-add a key ingredient to a formula for disaster.”  As the City 
argues, these are “[s]trong words from a respected jurist who expressly recognized that 
reinstatement was a preferred remedy.”  (Appellees‟ Br. at 13.)  The District Court, as it 
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was required to do, “articulate[d] its reasons when denying reinstatement.”  Squires, 54 
F.3d at 174 n.9.  The District Court‟s failure to discuss Nance‟s evidence regarding one 
of those reasons is not enough for us to conclude that its ruling constitutes an abuse of 
discretion, particularly given the absence of a transcript of the trial that the District Court 
observed and that expressly informed its decision.  See Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1103 (“The 
district court was in a much better position [than us] to determine whether or not 
reinstatement was feasible based on the testimony and evidence at trial.”) (quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original).  For these reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s order denying Nance‟s motion for reinstatement.4 
III. C.A. No. 11-2251 
 Nance also appeals from the District Court‟s order denying his motion for 
prejudgment interest.  Nance sought, and the District Court denied, interest on both the 
compensatory and punitive portions of the jury‟s award.  On appeal, Nance requests 
reversal only as to the denial of interest on the compensatory portion.  As the City argues, 
he has thus waived any challenge to the denial of interest on the punitive portion.  There 
is no basis to disturb that ruling in any event because prejudgment interest is not available 
on punitive damages awards.  See Belinski v. Goodman, 354 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1976) (applying New Jersey law); Poleto v. Consol. Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 
                                                 
4In light of our disposition, we need not reach the City‟s alternative argument that 
reinstating Nance would provide him with a double recovery to the extent that the jury‟s 
verdict might already include front-pay damages.  See Squires, 54 F.3d at 176. 
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1278 n.14 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 834-35 (1990) (applying federal law).
5
  As to the 
compensatory portion of the award, however, we will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings.
6
   
 We review the District Court‟s determination of whether to award prejudgment 
interest for abuse of discretion.  See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 
1995) (addressing prejudgment interest under Title VII).  When a plaintiff has been 
awarded some amount of backpay damages, however, there is a “strong presumption” in 
favor of awarding prejudgment interest in order to make the plaintiff whole.  Id. at 868.  
Thus, “[t]o the extent . . . that the damages awarded to the plaintiff represent 
compensation for lost wages, it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-
judgment interest.”  Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation 
marks omitted) (addressing prejudgment interest on a § 1983 retaliation claim); see also 
                                                 
5
 The availability of prejudgment interest on state-law claims is governed by state law, 
while the availability of such interest on claims under § 1983 is governed by federal law.  
See Simmons v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1088 (3d Cir. 1991); Poleto, 826 F.2d at 
1274 & n.6.  In this case, the jury entered a single compensatory award on Nance‟s 
claims under both the NJLAD and § 1983.  Neither the parties not the District Court 
addressed this issue, but the jury‟s general verdict presents no problem in this regard 
because there is no conflict between New Jersey and federal law on the points addressed 
herein. 
 
6
 Nance‟s pro se brief requests reversal as to the compensatory portion but does not 
develop any argument on this issue.  As explained below, however, the District Court did 
not provide any meaningful analysis of this issue either.  In addition, the City has not 
argued that Nance has waived this issue and instead has briefed it on the merits.  Under 
these circumstances, we will exercise our discretion to address the merits as well. 
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Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 900 A.2d 787, 793 (N.J. 2006) (noting policies supporting 
prejudgment interest awards under the NJLAD).
7
 
 In this case, the District Court summarily denied Nance‟s request for prejudgment  
interest on the grounds that (1) New Jersey law does not permit prejudgment interest on 
awards for future economic loss and (2) “it cannot be determined whether the [general] 
jury verdict is for non-economic loss or for future economic loss.”  We agree that 
prejudgment interest is not available under state or federal law on any portion of the 
award that might be attributable to future economic loss.  See Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 
512, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying New Jersey law); Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1278 n.14 
(applying federal law); see also Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 875 (“an award of prejudgment 
interest is not appropriate with respect to an award of damages for future losses” under § 
1983).  We conclude, however, that the District Court should have inquired more 
thoroughly into whether the award includes some identifiable component of past 
economic damages on which prejudgment interest generally should be awarded. 
 Instead of conducting that inquiry, the District Court relied on Mandile v. Clark 
Material Handling Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (D.N.J. 2004), aff‟d, 131 F. App‟x 836 
                                                 
7
 We previously held, in part on the basis of intermediate New Jersey appellate authority, 
that New Jersey law prohibits prejudgment interest against governmental entities on 
claims under the NJLAD.  See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep‟t, 174 F.3d 95, 130 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Maynard v. Mine Hill Twp., 582 A.2d 315, 318 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1990)); Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1511 (3d Cir. 1996) (same).  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has since clarified that prejudgment interest is indeed 
available against governmental entities under the NJLAD.  See Potente, 900 A.2d at 794. 
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(3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the jury‟s general verdict prevented the court from 
determining the nature of the jury‟s award.  That decision in turn relied on Poleto, in 
which we noted in dicta that the case before us “would allow for the practical application 
of prejudgment interest” because “the district court submitted carefully crafted special 
interrogatories to the jury that segregated past economic damages from . . . future 
economic damages.”  Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1277.  We contrasted that situation with 
situations in which the jury returns a general verdict and noted the “suggest[ion]” that a 
general verdict might be presumed already to account for prejudgment interest.  Poleto, 
826 F.2d at 1277.  We neither held nor opined, however, that parties must always request 
special interrogatories on the issue of damages or that the nature of a jury award can 
never be determined from a general verdict.  To the extent that Mandile suggests 
otherwise, we reject it.
8
 
 We find more persuasive for present purposes another decision on which the 
District Court relied but which does not actually support its ruling, Crowley v. Chait, No. 
85-2441, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40828 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2005) (not available in 
Westlaw).  The District Court relied on Crowley without further comment for the 
                                                 
8
We emphasize that requesting special jury interrogatories to facilitate the calculation of 
damages benefits both the litigants and the District Court and remains the better practice.  
See Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1088 (noting “the advisability of requesting separate verdicts 
on federal question and state pendent claims so as to facilitate the calculation of delay 
damages”).  We have never held that requesting such interrogatories is necessary to 
preserve a claim for prejudgment interest, however, and we decline to do so now.  Cf. 
Squires, 54 F.3d at 176 n.16 (noting the possibility of requiring a request for a jury 
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proposition that “the New Jersey Court Rules contemplate that the jury must return 
discrete verdicts as to past and future economic loss.”  Id. at *18-19.  In Crowley, 
however, the jury awarded a lump sum without the special interrogatories addressed to 
past and future harm that the court held New Jersey law requires.  See id. at *16.  Instead 
of merely assuming that the absence of such interrogatories made it impossible to 
determine whether the award included some identifiable component of past harm, the 
court went on to “carefully review[] the record” and determine what portion of the lump-
sum award was attributable to past harm and thus warranted prejudgment interest.  Id. at 
*21.  The District Court‟s reliance on Crowley in support of its summary denial is thus 
somewhat puzzling.   
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken an approach similar to that in 
Crowley in a case involving a claim of retaliatory termination under § 1983, which we 
find persuasive as well.  See Gierlinger, 160 F.3d 858.  In Gierlinger, the District Court 
denied prejudgment interest on a jury‟s lump-sum award because it assumed that the 
award already included prejudgment interest.  See id. at 874.  The Second Circuit vacated 
and remanded after declining to assume that the award included either prejudgment 
interest or future damages.  See id. at 874-75.  Instead of making that assumption, the 
Second Circuit looked to the record—including the verdict form, the evidence presented 
at trial, and the jury instructions—in order to determine, inter alia, whether there was “a 
                                                                                                                                                             
interrogatory on the issue of front-pay damages in order to preserve a claim for 
reinstatement). 
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reasonable basis for inferring that part of the jury‟s award sought to compensate for 
future losses[.]”  Id. at 875.  The court saw no such basis in that case, and the available 
record discloses no such basis in this case either. 
 To the contrary, the available record suggests that the jury may not have awarded 
anything for future loss at all.  That record includes the jury verdict form itself, which 
asked the jury only to “[p]lease state the amount that will fairly compensate Plaintiff for 
any injury which he actually sustained as a result of the City of Newark‟s conduct which 
shall include physical harm, emotional and mental harm and lost wages (income).”  
(Docket No. 215) (emphasis added).  The verdict form says nothing about future losses.  
Moreover, the City represents in its brief that “[p]laintiff presented opinion testimony 
about projected future economic losses, losses that allegedly exceeded $500,000.”  
(Appellees‟ Br. at 9.)  Because the jury awarded only $350,000 in compensatory 
damages, it may be that the jury awarded nothing for future loss.  And even if it did, the 
lack of significant analysis by the District Court gives us no assurance that it is 
impossible to determine how much.  We cannot and do not conclusively resolve this issue 
because the trial evidence and jury instructions are not contained in the record on appeal.  
The materials that are contained in the record, however, lead us to conclude that the 
District Court should have addressed this issue more thoroughly. 
 Thus, we will vacate and remand for the District Court to determine whether the 
jury‟s award includes some identifiable component of past economic damages on which 
prejudgment interest should be awarded.  The District Court is free to conduct such 
15 
 
further proceedings as may prove necessary in that regard, such as requiring briefing by 
the parties. 
IV. Conclusion 
 In sum, we will affirm the District Court‟s order of October 20, 2010, denying 
reinstatement, but will vacate its order of May 2, 2011, denying prejudgment interest and 
remand for further proceedings on that issue.  The City‟s motion to supplement the 
appendix in both appeals is granted, and its motion to dismiss C.A. No. 11-1593 for lack 
of jurisdiction is denied. 
